




Monetary and fiscal policy should be merged, which in turn 
changes the role of central banks. 
Ralph S. Musgrave. 




Keeping monetary and fiscal policy separate causes economic 
distortions, thus the two should be merged. That is, in a 
recession for example, the government and central bank should 
simply spend more (and/or collect less tax), and fund the latter 
from new or “printed” money.  
Merging monetary and fiscal policy necessitates a different 
relationship or split of responsibilities as between governments 
and central banks, but this is not a big problem. Plus the new 
relationship dispenses with an illogical element in the current 
typical relationship, namely that both central bank and 




Where government and central bank as a combined unit are 
referred to below, this will be called the “government and 
central bank” (GCB). Otherwise, the word government refers to 
parliament plus treasury alone, and the phrase “central bank” 
refers to the central bank alone. 2 
 
 
The phrase “net spend” refers to where government (or GCB) 
spends more than it collects in tax. Whether this is effected by 
cutting taxes or spending more (or both) is a political decision, 





The recession which started in 2007-8, like many recessions, 
was sparked off by excessive and irresponsible borrowing. The 
world responded by cutting interest rates to an all-time low with 
a view to bringing stimulus via increased borrowing: on the face 
of it, an absurdity. 
However pointing to absurdities or self-contradictions in a 
system does not prove that the system is not the best available: 
it must be shown that the system has fundamental flaws which 
do not plague some alternative and better system. And indeed 
the purpose of this paper is to point out the fundamental flaws 
in the existing system for regulating aggregate demand, and set 
out a better system. 
Keynes and Abba Lerner advocated that where additional 
aggregate demand was required, GCB should spend more, and 
fund this extra spending from borrowing or creating extra  
money. And conversely, when inflation loomed, GCB should do 
the opposite, for example, rein in money via additional tax and 
“unprint” or extinguish such money. 
I will argue in this paper, first that the above borrowing is 
pointless: that is, in a recession, GCB should simply create or 3 
 
 
“print” extra money and net spend it without funding this extra 
net expenditure from borrowing or tax.  
I will also argue that if printing extra money and raising net 
spending by the same amount become the only or the main tool 
for regulating aggregate demand, this has two implications. 
First it implies abolishing monetary and fiscal policies as 
separate entities, and that in turn implies abolishing interest 
rate adjustments, since the latter is monetary policy pure and 
simple. And second, abolishing the distinction between 
monetary and fiscal policy implies a different relationship or 
split of responsibilities between central bank and government. 
These two changes (merging fiscal and monetary policy and 
changing the role of central banks) do not involve any 
significant problems: in fact the results of these changes are 
entirely beneficial. In particular, merging monetary and fiscal 
policy disposes of a problem that is inherent in keeping the two 
policies separate, namely that the separation involves distorting 
the economy in numerous ways. Plus the new relationship 
dispenses with an illogical element in the current typical 
relationship, namely that both central bank and government can 
influence aggregate demand.  
This paper says nothing new in the sense that it basically just 
advocates Abba Lerner’s “money pump”. However, some of the 
points made below are hopefully new, as follows. First, a 
couple of mistakes made by Lerner about interest rates are 
dealt with. Second, there are the above mentioned points about 
merging fiscal and monetary policy and the resulting change for 
central banks, and hopefully some of this is new. 
I have written this paper with countries which issue their own 
currency in mind. The points made below obviously have 4 
 
 
implications for common currency areas, but these implications 
are not considered here. 
 
The futility of “borrow and spend”. 
Governments borrow for various reasons, but the one that is 
relevant here is what might be called Keynsian “borrow and 
spend” with a view to stimulus. 
The idea that government borrowing is pointless (for stimulus 
and other purposes) is not new. Friedman (1948) and Mosler 
(2010) advocated a “zero borrowing” regime. 
I also advocated the idea (Musgrave (2010)). So I’ll just 
summarise the arguments here rather than set them out in 
detail. The arguments are thus.   
First, when GCB borrows, it borrows something (money) which 
GCB itself has created and which it can create in limitless 
amounts. Thus for a sovereign currency issuing country to 
borrow units of its currency is similar to, and as pointless as a 
dairy farmer buying milk in a shop.  
Second, borrowing is deflationary. Given that the object of the 
exercise is the opposite of deflation, i.e. stimulus, it is hard to 
see the point of the borrowing. “Borrow and spend” is a bit like 
throwing a mixture of petrol and water on a fire.  
Third, the extent of the above deflationary effect (i.e. crowding 
out) is uncertain. Crowding out would not matter if there were 
agreement on the extent of the problem. But there is a lack of 
agreement. Thus introducing crowding out first introduces 
uncertainty. Second, if crowding out is a serious problem - say 
90% of borrow and spend is nullified by crowding out - the 
expansion in the national debt for given stimulus is likely to be 5 
 
 
much larger than the expansion in the monetary base required 
for the same stimulus. This large increase in the debt for given 
stimulus is hardly desirable, particularly in view of recent 
concerns about the size of national debts. Indeed, it is possible 
that the recent large increases in national debts combined with 
resulting increases in demand which have been scarcely 
enough to counter the recession, are explained by crowding 
out. 
 
The alleged reasons for government borrowing. 
Keynes and Lerner both believed that extra government net 
spending was needed in a recession. As to the choice between 
funding this expenditure from borrowing versus printing, 
Keynes was on the face of it fairly indifferent between the two, 
while Lerner favoured printing. 
As to whether Keynes was really indifferent as between the two 
options, there is some evidence that in public he favoured the 
borrowing option only because he regarded himself as being 
surrounded by economic illiterates under the illusion that 
creating extra money necessarily leads to inflation. 
As distinct from borrowing for stimulus purposes, Lerner 
thought borrowing would still be desirable so as to control 
inflation. Lerner (1943) claimed that “The second law of 
Functional Finance is that the government should borrow 
money only if it is desirable that the public should have less 
money and more government bonds…This might be desirable if 
otherwise the rate of interest would be reduced too low . . . and 
thus induce too much investment, thus bringing about inflation.” 
This argument contains a contradiction, as follows. Keynes, 
Lerner and indeed most economists agree that extra spending 6 
 
 
brings extra demand, which, if it goes too far, will cause excess 
inflation. Now if inflation really is a problem, then clearly raised 
interest rates may solve the problem. But why not just cut 
spending? In other words, to implement excess spending, and 
then ameliorate the problem by raising interest rates is bizarre 
to put it politely. 
The only possible justification for the above interest rate policy 
is that adjusting interest rates works more quickly than 
adjusting spending. Certainly interest rates can be adjusted at 
the flick of a switch, but that in itself does not influence the 
economy for a year or so. Thus what might be called “speed of 
implementation” is irrelevant: the important question is the lag 
between the decision to influence the economy and the actual 
effect on the economy. And there does not seem to be much 
difference between fiscal and monetary policy here. Thus the 
argument for using interest rate adjustments rather than 
spending adjustments to rein in excess demand looks weak. 
A second argument that seems to have been put by Lerner for 
government borrowing is that this would enable governments to 
adjust interest rates and thus bring about the optimum amount 
of investment (according to Colander (2002, p.2)). I take this to 
mean “optimum” in the sense of “optimum total amount of 
investment for purposes other than controlling inflation”. 
This idea is just plain unrealistic. That is, the idea that 
politicians, bureaucrats or economists actually know what the 
optimum level of investment is, is laughable. Moreover, there 
are large uncertainties involved in any investment. Plus most 
investments involve large costs in addition to interest rate 
costs. Thus altering interest rates by a percentage point or two 




Of course the difference between central banks’ base rate in a 
recession as compared to more normal times is more than “a 
percentage point or two”. But that is near irrelevant for 
households seeking a mortgage or for businesses, because it is 
primarily long term investments involved here, thus it is long 
term interest rates that are relevant. And long term rates do not 
vary by more than the above “percentage point or two”.  
To summarise so far, hopefully it has been established that 
where stimulus is needed, GCB should simply net spend more, 
and do so without borrowing to cover that spending.   
The next problem or set of problems to be considered are the  




Before considering the specific ways in which different fiscal 
and monetary policies distort economies, a word about why 
distortions matter is in order. 
There is nothing wrong with distorting an economy in the sense 
of making a permanent change where government has decided 
on that change (e.g. spending more on state education).  These 
sorts of changes will raise unemployment while people shift 
from one sector of the economy to another.  But that is 
unavoidable. 
It is quite a different matter where a change or distortion is 
effected, only to be reversed a few months or years later, as is 
normally the case with anti-recessionary monetary or fiscal 
policies. The initial change has an unemployment raising effect; 8 
 
 
then a short time later the unemployment raising effect 
continues, as the change is reversed!  
Various specific and distortionary anti-recessionary policies will 
now be examined. 
 
Interest rate adjustments involve distortion. 
Adjusting interest rates is one of the main elements in monetary 
policy. But this distorts the economy in several ways, as follow. 
i) Constantly making artificial changes to interest rates must 
result in an interest rate which is not the free market rate most 
of the time. 
The basic purpose of interest is to optimise the relationship 
between lenders and borrowers. That is, borrowers in their own 
opinion derive benefits from borrowing, while lenders undergo a 
cost, namely foregone consumption. If the latter cost and 
benefits can be equalised, at least at the margin, then the 
relevant economy will enjoy the optimum amount of lending and 
borrowing. 
It is generally accepted that interfering with the free market is 
not justified unless market failure can be demonstrated, and 
secondly, it can be demonstrated that having the state make 
the relevant decisions results in a better outcome than the 
market.  
Now there may well be specific instances of market failure 
when it comes to lending and borrowing, e.g. loan sharks or 
“No Income No Job or Assets” mortgages. But I know of no 
evidence that for the bulk of borrowing and lending, the market 
gets interest rates wrong. Thus artificial interferences with the 
rate of interest will result on a non-optimum amount borrowing. 9 
 
 
ii) Interest rate adjustments work only via entities that are 
significantly reliant on variable rate borrowing. Thus for 
example, come an interest rate cut, a firm that is heavily reliant 
on variable rate borrowing will benefit, while firms that are in 
other respects identical except that they don’t rely on variable 
rate borrowing will not benefit. This constitutes a distortion. 
Given that the purpose of an interest rate cut is to boost the 
whole economy, not just parts of the economy, interest rate 
cuts are clearly not a very good tool for the job.  
iii) Even if every firm and household borrowed the same 
amount relative to turnover, interest rate adjustments would 
influence investment decisions in ways that are harmful, and for 
the following reasons. 
If there were some evidence that at the start of recession, the 
total amount of investment was below optimum, then interest 
rate reductions at the start of a recession would make sense. 
But unfortunately the evidence is that the amount of investment 
at the start of recessions is excessive, not deficient. This was 
certainly the case with the recent recession where ludicrous 
and unsustainable levels of investment in both residential and 
commercial property were one of the main roots of the problem 
(as mentioned at the outset above). 
And not only was this obviously the case with the recent 
recession, but there are plenty of economists who argue that 
this “excess investment” is the norm just before recessions 
(e.g. Huerta do Soto (1998)).Thus dropping interest rates at the 
start of a recession is wholly illogical. 
It is true that after two or three years of recession, the stock of 
capital equipment may fall to less than the level that would 
obtain at full employment. Indeed, America’s stock of capital 10 
 
 
equipment fell during part of the recent recession. But the latter 
point does not make the case for using interest rates to 
ameliorate recessions. That is, if an economy is two or three 
years into a recession, a straight rise in demand would induce 
employers to expand investment. So why it is necessary for 
politicians or central banks to give employers any sort of 
special incentive to invest is a mystery.   
Or perhaps there is no mystery here. Perhaps it is simply that 
politicians, central bankers and economists seriously think they 
know better than the average business when and when not to 
invest. So far as most entrepreneurs are concerned, politicians, 
bankers and economists can take their views on investment, 
and feed them into the nearest shredder. 
The above point can be put another way, as follows.  Altering 
interest rates alters the amount that employers invest relative to 
turnover. Now where is the evidence that the latter ratio 
(investment to turnover) suddenly changes just because an 
economy is well into a recession rather than at the start of a 
recession or not in a recession at all? The very idea is a joke. 
iv) Adjusting interest rates results in hot money flowing in or out 
of a country, which in turn changes the value of the country’s 
currency on foreign exchange markets. And this in turn makes 
life difficult for exporters and importers. 
Of course adjusting demand in a merged monetary and fiscal 
policy scenario would not leave the value of the relevant 
country’s currency totally unaffected, but this is unavoidable. 
That is, where demand rises for any reason (e.g. increased 
consumer confidence), that will tend to draw in imports, which 
in turn will tend to reduce the price of the relevant country’s 
currency. That effect is, to repeat, unavoidable. 11 
 
 
v) It is precisely variations in demand for capital equipment 
which is one of the main causes of economic instability (via the 
accelerator). Thus trying to vary demand for capital equipment 
with a view to stabilising an economy is not a smart move. 
 
Quantitative easing. 
Quantitative easing is a monetary policy. But its main effect is 
to increase asset prices, which in turn increases spending by 
the rich. But unfortunately, this is not an effective policy in that 
the propensity of the rich to change their spending habits when 
their income or assets change in value is significantly smaller 
than is the case for the poor. That is distortionary. In other 
words anti recessionary measures should be neutral as 
between rich, poor and all other groups. Or to put it a third way, 
altering the incomes of the rich relative to the incomes of the 
poor is a perfectly legitimate change to make. But it is illogical 
to use this sort of change as an anti-recessionary tool. 
  
The distortions caused by fiscal policy. 
Some fiscal changes deliberately alter the structure or shape of 
an economy, and to that extent could be called distortionary, 
but are nevertheless justified. Examples include a decision to 
raise direct taxes at the expense of indirect taxes or to spend 
more on state education. 
These types of changes are perfectly legitimate. But they are 
not of much relevance here. That is, there is no good reason, in 
attempting to combat a recession to concentrate, for example, 
on education. 12 
 
 
In contrast, there are various fiscal changes much more suited 
to combating a recession precisely because they do not 
concentrate on particular sectors of the economy, and are thus 
not distortionary.  Examples include cutting a payroll tax or 
cutting a sales tax. (The UK temporarily cut its sales tax (VAT) 
during the recent recession). 
For example, cutting employees’ contribution to a payroll tax 
affects every employee in the country. That of course leaves 
out various groups like pensioners and the unemployed. But it 
would not be difficult to alter the take home pay of both the 
latter groups at the same time as altering the take home pay of 
employees. Indeed, in the UK, pensioners pay is given a 
temporary boost in the middle of winter to help them pay 
heating costs (plus this varies with the severity of the winter). 
However, even if fiscal policy is as non-distortionary as 
possible, using fiscal policy alone (i.e. without monetary policy) 
is still distortionary, and for the following reasons. 
Where government spends more, and funds this with increased 
borrowing, this is pure fiscal policy. But the interest rate hike 
that ensues is itself distortionary, for reasons given above 
(unless you believe that the latter borrowing involves no 
crowding whatever). 
 
The fundamental reason for distortions. 
If there was a significant tendency for people with brown hair to 
have more car accidents than people with black hair, there 
would have to be some explanation. Likewise, if there are 
several instances of fiscal or monetary policies when 
implemented in isolation having a distortionary effect, there 13 
 
 
must be some explanation. The explanation is quite simple and 
is as follows. 
What is required in a recession is an OVERALL expansion in 
the economy.  That is, the existence of a recession is not a 
reason to favour one sector of the economy above any other. 
Thus any policy which DOES favour some sectors more than 
others is ipso facto distortionary. 
Moreover, what is required in a recession is an increase in 
aggregate demand, and effecting the latter involves boosting 
the source of all demand: that is, first, the consumer, and 
second government spending. In fact the latter (government 
spending) is essentially a form of consumer spending in the 
sense that consumers vote at election time to have part of their 
income confiscated by government and spent on various 
communal or pubic goods: maintaining law and order, state 
education, etc. 
So in a recession, the aim should be to expand government 
spending and consumer spending by the same percentage.  
   
A new relationship between central banks and 
governments. 
Under current or conventional arrangements, most central 
banks adjust interest rates or make other monetary 
adjustments, while governments make fiscal adjustments. 
However, in a merged fiscal and monetary scenario, the two 
obviously cannot act independently. That is, when it is decided 
to raise government spending by $X a year, that implies the 
creation of $X of additional monetary base. The former is fiscal 
and the latter is monetary. What to do? 14 
 
 
A possible way of effecting the above would be to have finance 
ministers and/or other politicians sitting in the same room as 
supposedly independent central bank staff when making 
changes to total government spending. But that probably 
involves having politicians too close to the printing press.  
A solution to this problem is to have the central bank 
responsible for deciding whether inflation is subdued enough to 
allow more government net spending, while political parties and 
parliaments decide the obviously political questions, such as 
how GDP should be split as between public and private 
spending, and how the public portion should be spent. 
The latter split of responsibilities as between governments and 
central banks is a perfectly logical division of labour. That is, 
the decision on how big a threat inflation poses is a technical 
one, and is best taken by technicians, that is economists. Of 
course economists’ record in predicting inflation levels a year or 
two hence is far from perfect. But they are better at it than 
politicians. Plus economists have no motive to bias their 
forecasts, or ignore the forecasts and advocate more spending 
than they think is warranted by inflation. 
In contrast, and as mentioned above, the decision as to how 
GDP should be split as between public and private spending is 
a purely political decision, as are decisions on the make-up of 
public spending. The latter sort of decision should be taken by 
politicians and the democratic process.  
Indeed, this split of responsibilities makes more sense than 
current arrangements for the following reasons. Allowing 
governments to abstain from collecting enough tax and borrow 
instead is generally regarded as having a stimulatory effect. But 
central banks also take a position on the “stimulus / deflation” 
scale. So we have two organisations with a say on the stimulus 15 
 
 
/ deflation question. This makes about as much sense as 
having a car with two steering wheels, each of which is 
controlled by a different person. 
Put another way, while an independent central bank keeps 
politicians away from the money printing press in the narrowest 
sense of the word “money”, it does not keep politicians away 
from a slightly different type of printing press: the “debt printing 
press”. And this has proved a huge problem over the last 
decade or so: that is, many countries’ national debts have 
ballooned recently to record levels. The above re-arrangement 
of responsibilities as between governments and central banks 
would solve this problem. 
Of course that is not to say that all of the above “ballooning 
debt” is wholly unjustified. For example if you believe that 
Keynsian “borrow and spend” works, and that it is the best 
option for stimulus purposes, then you will believe that part of 
the debt is justified (although one of the central claims of this 
paper is that there is a better option than Keynsian borrow and 
spend).  
On the other hand a significant portion of many counties’ 
current debt stems from attempts by politicians to ingratiate 
themselves with voters by borrowing as a substitute for tax. 
This form of borrowing is wholly unjustified, and the merged 
fiscal and monetary policy advocated here ought to prevent this 
form of borrowing.  
 
Fiscal committees. 
Having claimed above that central banks alone should be 
responsible for the degree of stimulus or deflation applied to an 
economy, this is not to say that this decision absolutely has to 16 
 
 
be in the hands of central banks. The important point, as 
mentioned above, is that the decision is in the hands of experts 
who are independent of politicians. Whether those experts are 
part of a central bank or not is probably not too important. 
Indeed committees or organisations which consist at least 
partially of such experts already exist in some countries in the 
form of so called fiscal committees. And in the US there is the 
Congressional Budget Office, though the latter is far too close 
to political parties to be called “independent” at the moment. 
And in the UK, there is the Office for Budget Responsibility. 
However, the existence of THREE bodies, government, central 
bank AND a fiscal committee does not make sense. To repeat, 
there are just two types of decision and thus two bodies 
required. First there are the strictly political decisions, like the 
proportion of GDP devoted to public spending. And second, 
there is the technical decision, namely whether inflation is 
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